This section provides whatever tips and guidelines have occurred to the author. We can hope that the section expands over time.
      Generally, with a well-behaved application and well-implemented
      database design, Veil2 adds little
      performance overhead.  This is because it, mostly, only applies
      permission checks on the records that the user sees.  If the
      user is only going to see a few records, the overhead of
      checking those few records is going to be small.
    
      However, if you make Veil2 do your query
      filtering for you instead of writing properly crafted
      where-clauses, performance is going to suck.  Consider the
      following queries:
      
select stuff
  from parties
 where org_id = 20
   and party_name like '%Bob%';
select stuff
 from parties
where party_name like '%Bob%';
      
      Assume that we are in a Veil2-protected
      database and that we have select access only to
      org_id 4.
    
Both queries will return the same number of rows. But in a database with lots of parties, the second query will be slow.
      In the second query, a full-table scan will be performed, and
      many Bobs from other orgs might be returned, only to be
      discarded by the Veil2-based security policy.
    
The first query will, most likely, use an index and return a much smaller set of records, which will then be filtered looking for Bob, and finally checked against the security policy. In this case the security policy has only had to check records that the user was allowed to see anyway.
For most applications, any time that a security policy blocks something, the application has done something wrong. You should consider this a bug in the application. Although no harm will be done, this is an indication of one of two things:
the application has not been properly implemented;
your security policy is over-restrictive.
In either case, it makes sense to note the occurrence and investigate. Note that in a reporting environment where ad-hoc reports can be run, this may prove less useful.
Adding such a check is pretty straightforward. Consider this policy:
create policy wibble__select
    on wibble
   for select
 using (veil2.i_have_global_priv(42));
      
      To add logging on error, you can simply add a final
      or to the policy with a function call to a
      logging function (that always returns false), eg:
      
create policy wibble__select
    on wibble
   for select
   using (veil2.i_have_global_priv(42) or
          log_unwanted_access('wibble', <concatenation of key fields>));
      
Your logging function needs to take enough parameters to identify the record to which access has been attempted, must return false, and should identify the accessor by querying from veil2_session_context. Performance should not be a great concern as you expect the function to rarely be called.
If you have automated tests, you should run them against both secured and unsecured databases. If the tests pass in both instances, then your application and the security implementation are in harmony, and you should be very pleased with yourselves. Encourage your employer to provide handsome bonuses.
If you find that your security policies require joins to other tables (possibly through function calls), then your security system's performance may suffer. Consider adding scope_id columns to some tables to improve the performance of security tests. You might also consider doing this just to simplify those tests.
You may find that multi-table queries encounter performance issues as the security policy has to be applied for some tables on more rows than are ultimately returned by the query. If you cannot find a way to improve the query by rewriting, then consider replacing it with a secured view instead.
The secured view would implement the joins and whatever filtering can be written in to the view, and would then apply a security policy only to the resulting rows, rather than to intermediate rows that are discarded by subsequent joins in the original query.
      While you are integrating Veil2 with your
      application and continuing to develop it, you are likely to
      create and drop your own database objects as they change.  Be
      aware that through the veil2.accessors table
      and veil2.superior_scopes view,
      veil2 (and possibly other objects) is tightly
      coupled with your application schema. 
    
      This may mean that it is impossible to to drop some of your
      database objects because Veil2 database
      objects depend on them.  Using the cascade
      option to drop will allow the drop to proceed
      but will result in dependent Veil2 objects
      being dropped as well.  Recovering from this can be a tedious
      and potentially error-prone process.
    
      We recommend avoiding the use of
      drop... cascade and instead scripting a
      drop and rebuild process that will explicitly deal with each
      dependent object.  By making each drop explicit you can ensure
      that you correctly manage the re-building of those objects.